Tuesday, December 10, 2019

What to look for in subcontractor warranty endorsements

With increasing frequency in the construction defect cases we defend, we are seeing commercial general liability insurance policies with “subcontractor warranty” endorsements.  Also known as contractor or subcontractor special conditions, these endorsements could have severe and negative consequences for builders that do not comply with their requirements.  In researching for this article, I reviewed six different endorsements used by six different carriers, all of which contained some or all of the following requirements:

  • The builder must have signed subcontract agreements with its subcontractors that require subcontractors to hold harmless, i.e., defend and indemnify, the builder for “bodily injury” or “property damage” claims caused by their negligence.
  • The subcontractors must maintain their own insurance with limits equal to or greater than the limits in the builder’s own policy, with limits of at least $1 million per occurrence.
  • The subcontractors’ insurance must not exclude the work being performed for the builder, e.g., the excavator’s policy cannot exclude earth movement claims, the subcontractor’s policy cannot exclude residential construction.
  • The subcontractors must maintain their own workers’ compensation and/or employer’s liability insurance.
  • The subcontractors must provide the builder with an endorsement or a certificate of insurance indicating that the builder has been added to the subcontractors’ insurance as an additional insured.
  • The subcontractors must provide the builder with an endorsement or a certificate of insurance indicating that their insurance carriers have agreed to provide waivers of subrogation in favor of the builder.
  • The builder must maintain records evidencing compliance with these requirements through the applicable statute of repose.
  • The builder must obtain proof that the subcontractors have all licenses as required by local or state statute, regulation or ordinance, and that such licenses are up to date.
Failure to comply with one or more of these requirements can have disastrous implications for the builder.  Depending on the wording of the actual endorsement, these consequences could include complete nullification of coverage relative to a loss caused by the subcontractors’ work, the imposition of a higher deductible or retained limit being applied to a loss caused by subcontractors, a lower limit of liability being applied to a loss caused by subcontractors, or the carrier increasing the premium for insurance after an audit of the records provided by the builder.

While the severity of the consequences may be lessened for builders using wrap insurance programs for their projects, this should be of serious concern for builders insuring themselves through annual renewable insurance programs.  My recommendation is for builders to work with their insurance agents or brokers to determine if it is possible to obtain insurance without the subcontractor warranty endorsement.  If not, it is imperative that builders understand the requirements of the subcontractor warranty endorsements and that they comply with those requirements.  This absolutely a situation in which an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, assuming that any cure is even possible.     

For additional information about subcontractor warranty endorsements, or about construction litigation in Colorado, you can reach Dave McLain at (303) 987-9813 or by e-mail at mclain@hhmrlaw.com.  

Wednesday, November 13, 2019

The Importance of Notice under the Construction Defect Action Reform Act: Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. High Country Coatings, Inc.[1]

Last April, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado decided in an action for declaratory relief that the Colorado Construction Defect Action Reform Act (“CDARA”) does not afford insurers the right to separate notice, beyond that of the claimant to the construction professional, of their duty to defend the insured.

This case, Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. High Country Coatings, Inc., involves a dispute between a construction professional, High Country Coatings (hereinafter “HCC”), and its insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company (hereinafter “AOIC”). In 2012, HCC entered into a subcontract with Brinkman Construction to install floor coatings on a concrete floor in an airplane hangar. Soon after the work was complete, the flooring bubbled and blistered. Brinkman demanded that HCC re-do the floors.

However, before HCC installed the new floor coatings, its liability policy with AOIC terminated, and it entered into a new commercial general liability policy with AOIC. After HCC’s second coating of the floor resulted in bubbling and blistering, Brinkman’s insurer, Zurich, sent a letter to HCC indicating that the owner of the aircraft hangar asserted construction defect claims against Brinkman and HCC. Within days, HCC reported the claim to its insurer, AOIC. Almost a year later, AOIC denied HCC’s claim because there did not appear to be damage alleged outside of the scope of HCC’s work, triggering certain exclusions.

In November 2016, Zurich sued HCC in the District Court for Arapahoe County. AOIC appointed counsel to defend HCC in the Arapahoe County action, while reserving the right to deny the claim. A month later, AOIC sued HCC and Zurich in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to defend HCC in the Arapahoe County action. U.S. District Court Judge Jackson found that AOIC did have a duty to defend HCC. Soon after, the jury in the Arapahoe County action returned a verdict in favor of HCC.

AOIC responded by amending its federal complaint for declaratory relief, claiming it owed no duty to defend HCC prior to the Arapahoe County case. In its motion for summary judgment, AOIC argued it had no duty to defend HCC prior to the Arapahoe County action because it never received a CDARA notice that would trigger its duty to defend. Because the duty to defend under the CDARA arises upon either the service of the notice of claim of defects or upon the filing of an action, and HCC never provided the statutory notice to AOIC, AOIC argued that it was not obligated to defend. AOIC further argued that the letter from Zurich to HCC that initially reported the construction defect claim was insufficient statutory notice under CDARA.

In evaluating this argument, Judge Jackson applied the policy of C.R.S. § 13-20-808, that is, to construe insurance contracts in favor of the insured as reasonably and objectively as possible. Looking at the plain language of the statute, that an insurer “shall defend a construction professional who has received a notice of claim,” Judge Jackson determined that an insurance company’s duty to defend its insured occurs as soon as notice is made to the construction professional itself, not the insurer. Further, Judge Jackson was not convinced by AOIC’s argument that the notice of claim should have come from the property owner itself, not Zurich. In fact, C.R.S. § 13-20-802.5(5) only requires notice to come from “a claimant,” which could include Zurich, on behalf of Brinkman. Judge Jackson granted summary judgment in favor of HCC on these issues.

However, Judge Jackson found a genuine dispute of material fact existed with regard to whether Zurich’s letter described the claim with sufficient detail to determine the nature of the defect and claimed damages, as required by CDARA. This factual dispute would need to go to the jury, should AOIC wish to pursue it.

This case is instructive for at least three reasons. First, it is important that claimants follow the letter of the law with precision and detail when giving notice of a construction defect claim.[2] Second, insurers cannot avoid the duty to defend because notice did not come to them separately or from a particular claimant. Finally, this case serves as a reminder that CDARA explicitly favors both 1) “the interpretation of insurance coverage broadly for the insured” and 2) “a broad interpretation of an insurer’s duty to defend.” C.R.S. § 13-20-808.

For additional information about the Auto-Owners v. High Country Coatings decision or construction litigation in general, you can reach Ben Volpe by telephone at (303) 987-7140 or by e-mail at Volpe@hhmrlaw.com.

[1] Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. High Country Coatings, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1328 (D. Colo. 2019).
[2] “Notice of claim” means a written notice sent by a claimant to the last known address of a construction professional against whom the claimant asserts a construction defect claim that describes the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature of the defect, including a general description of the type and location of the construction that the claimant alleges to be defective and any damages claimed to have been caused by the defect. C.R.S. § 13-20-802.5.

Friday, November 8, 2019

Ben Volpe joins Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell

Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell is pleased to announce that Ben Volpe has joined the firm as an Associate. He is a graduate of the Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law, graduating cum laude.

Mr. Volpe has experience working as a federal contractor supporting the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Mr. Volpe also served as a sworn university police officer at his graduate school, George Washington University. His practice will focus on construction litigation and the defense of general casualty claims.

Welcome aboard, Ben!

You can reach Ben Volpe by e-mail at volpe@hhmrlaw.com or by telephone at (303) 987-7140.

Monday, October 28, 2019

Dave McLain named Barrister’s Best Construction Defects Lawyer for Defendants for 2019

The attorneys and staff at Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell are proud to announce that Law Week Colorado named Founding Member Dave McLain as the 2019 People’s Choice for Best Construction Defects Lawyer for Defendants.  According to the publication:

Law Week Colorado asked its readership to weigh in on the best attorneys in just about every practice area we could think of.  We received hundreds of responses and sifted through the votes for each category to determine the “People’s Choice” winner – the top attorney in each practice area according to other attorneys.  And then we handed it to the “Barrister” (the hive mind of Law Week staff, supplemented by public votes and a healthy dose of additional research) to determine the Barrister’s Choice. 

In recognizing Mr. McLain this year, Law Week Colorado stated:

Previously appearing in Law Week’s 2015 Barrister’s Best issue [in which he was recognized as the Barrister’s Choice as Best Construction Defects Lawyer for Defendants], David McLain participates in numerous speaking engagements on construction defects claims and is seen as a leader in the field.  His extensive experience over the last two decades of practice speaks for itself.

In response to the recognition, Founding Member Sheri Roswell stated: “David has long been admired by colleagues and co-workers for his depth of knowledge and commitment to excellence in serving the legal needs of the construction industry.  It is wonderful to see David’s skill and dedication recognized by peers in the community; there is no one more deserving of the honor.”

Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell exists to embody and exemplify the principles of service and stewardship.  In everything we do, we focus on serving our clients selflessly and to the best of our ability.  The firm is highly regarded for its expertise in construction law and the litigation of construction related claims, including the defense of large and complex construction defect matters. In addition to their construction law background, HHMR's attorneys are well versed and experienced in tort, contract, property and general casualty litigation ranging from products liability to personal injury and premises liability claims.

Tuesday, October 22, 2019

Dreyer v. Am. Natl. Prop. & Cas. Co. Or: Do Not Enter into Nunn-Agreements for Injuries that Occurred After Expiration of the Subject Insurance Policy

While Nunn-Agreements[1] may be appealing for both plaintiffs and defendants where an insurer unreasonably fails to defend a lawsuit, a recent opinion from The Honorable Marcia Krieger in the United States District Court of Colorado[2] (“Opinion”) demonstrates the importance of first confirming that there exists a viable insurance claim before proceeding with such a Nunn- Agreement.

The facts giving rise to the Opinion were as follows. In March 2015, a Homeowner couple (the “Homeowners”) suffered damages to their home resulting from a brushfire. Fortunately, the Homeowners were insured, they submitted their claim to their homeowners’ insurance carrier which was in effect at the time of the brushfire (the “Insurance Carrier”), and the Insurance Carrier paid the claim. Ostensibly as part of the Homeowners’ remediation efforts to their home they removed a large bush which left a hole in the ground.  After paying the claim, in August 2015 the Insurance Carrier cancelled or elected not to renew the Homeowners’ policy. In October 2015, a repairman working on the Home (the “Repairman”) was injured after his ladder fell over allegedly because of the hole in the ground caused by the bush that had been removed.

As a result of injuries caused by the fall from the ladder, the Repairman brought suit against the Homeowners. In response to the Repairman’s claim, the Homeowners again tendered to their Insurance Carrier. This time, however, the Insurance Carrier denied coverage on the basis that the Repairman’s injuries occurred after the expiration of the relevant policy. Without insurance coverage, the Homeowner’s entered into a Nunn-Agreement with the Repairman, conceding liability, and assigning any claims they might have had against the Insurance Carrier in lieu of execution of any judgment against the Homeowners.

The Repairman, as an assignee of the Homeowners, brought a number of claims predicated generally on breach of the relevant insurance contract against the Insurance Carrier. In turn, the Insurance Carrier moved to dismiss the action arguing that the injury occurred after the expiration of the relevant policy and thus was not a covered loss. 

With this background Judge Krieger was tasked with evaluating whether the fall from the ladder (which occurred after the expiration of the policy) or the brushfire (which occurred within the policy period) should constitute the “occurrence” under the insurance policy.

In making her determination, Judge Krieger noted that the policy provided coverage for injuries resulting from an “occurrence,” which the policy defined as “an accident. . . result[ing] in bodily injury or property damage during the policy period.” Judge Krieger further noted that the plain language of the contract made clear that the “occurrence” – the precipitating event that triggers coverage – is the “accident” that results in the injury. Because Judge Krieger concluded that the accident that resulted in the Repairman’s injury was him falling off the ladder, not the brushfire, Judge Krieger determined that there existed no insurance coverage and no viable claims for breach of the subject insurance contract. Based on the foregoing, Judge Krieger dismissed all of the Repairman’s claims.

In summary, careful practitioners should confirm there exists a viable insurance claim before proceeding with a Nunn-Agreement. 

For additional information regarding Nunn-Agreements or about construction defect litigation in Colorado, generally, you can reach Jean Meyer by telephone at (303) 987-9815 or by e-mail at meyer@hhmrlaw.com.

[1] Nunn v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 244 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2010).
[2] Dreyer v. Am. Natl. Prop. & Cas. Co., 18-CV-03334-MSK-SKC, 2019 WL 3002927 (D. Colo. July 10, 2019)

Friday, October 11, 2019

Insurance Company’s Reservation of Rights Letter Negates its Interest in the Litigation

The Colorado Court of Appeals held that an insurance company, which issues a reservation of rights letter to its insured, loses its interest in the litigation, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), when the insured settles the claims and assigns the bad faith action against the insurance company to the plaintiff.  Bolt Factory Lofts Owners Association, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 2019WL 3483901(Colo. App. 2019).

In a 2016 lawsuit in Denver District Court, 2016CV3360, the Bolt Factory Loft Owners Association, Inc. (“Association”) asserted construction defect claims against six contractors.  Two of those contractors then asserted claims against other subcontractors, including Sierra Glass Co., Inc. (“Sierra Glass”).  After multiple settlements, the only remaining claims were those the Association, as assignee of the two contractors, asserted against Sierra Glass.

Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“AOIC”) issued policies to Sierra Glass and defended it under a reservation of rights.  The policy afforded AOIC the right to defend Sierra Glass, and it required Sierra Glass to cooperate in the defense of the legal action.  The Association presented a settlement demand of $1.9 million to Sierra Glass, which AOIC refused to pay.  To protect itself from an excess judgment that AOIC might not have paid, Sierra Glass entered into an agreement with the Association whereby Sierra Glass would refrain from offering a defense at trial and assign its bad faith claim against AOIC to the Association in exchange for the Association’s promise that it would not pursue recovery against Sierra Glass of any judgment entered against it at trial.  Such agreements, known as Bashor or Nunn Agreements, are allowed in Colorado.  Nunn v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 244 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2010).  Therefore, Sierra Glass was entitled to protect itself in the face of AOIC’s potential denial of coverage and refusal to settle.  Bolt Factory Lofts, at 15.

AOIC learned of the Sierra Glass agreement with the Association the day before the trial was to begin.  The fifteen-day jury trial was reduced to a two-day bench trial as Sierra Glass would no longer put on any defense against the Association’s claims.  AOIC moved to intervene, continue the trial, contest the settlement agreement, and protect its rights under the insurance policies.  The trial court held that the agreement was valid under Nunn and denied AOIC’s motion to intervene.  Following the two-day trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Association, and against Sierra Glass, for $2,489,021.91.

On July 27, 2018, AOIC timely appealed the trial court’s judgment, discussed below.  Prior to that, on June 18, 2018, the Association obtained a writ of garnishment against AOIC in the Denver District Court, which AOIC removed to the U.S. District Court of Colorado, 18CV01725, on July 9, 2018.  AOIC sought a declaration in the garnishment action that that Sierra Glass breached the policy by failing to cooperate with AOIC and that the judgment obtained in the underlying lawsuit was not enforceable against AOIC.  In response, the Association asserted counterclaims against AOIC for: 1) breach of contract; 2) statutory unreasonable denial of payment of a benefit; and 3) common law bad faith.  AOIC argued that the Association’s counterclaims were contingent on the outcome of the appeal in the underlying lawsuit and must be dismissed because they were not ripe.    Judge Brooke Jackson agreed, however, he also found that AOIC’s claims were not ripe as they also relied, in large part, on the trial court’s judgment.  Judge Jackson noted that the ripeness doctrine asks whether a controversy is certain and not contingent on future events.  He found that if AOIC prevailed on the appeal by successfully vacating the judgment, part of the declaratory relief it requested would no longer be necessary.  Thus, the claims were not ripe for AOIC or the Association, and this case was dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice.

With respect to the appeal of the trial court’s judgment, the Colorado Court of Appeals, Division VI (18CA1201), affirmed the trial court’s denial of AOIC’s motion to intervene.  C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) provides for intervention as a matter of right when:

1.         The applicant claims an interest in the subject matter of the litigation;
2.         Disposition of the action may impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest; and
3.         The applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.

Failure to satisfy one element of this rule precludes a motion to intervene as of right.  Bolt Factory Lofts, at 10.[1]  The appellate court found that AOIC failed to satisfy the first element and affirmed the trial court’s order without considering the other two elements. 

It was undisputed that AOIC reserved the right to deny coverage.  Id. at 15.  Thus, its interest in the litigation was contingent on the liability phase of the proceedings.  While the existence of an interest should be determined in a liberal manner, if the interest is contingent, it may be insufficient to warrant intervention.  Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.[2]  Where an insurer reserves the right to deny coverage, “the insurer’s interest in the liability phase of the proceeding is contingent on the resolution of the coverage issue.”  Id. at 14.[3]

Allowing AOIC to intervene to protect its contingent interest would allow it to interfere with and in effect control the defense.  Such intervention would unfairly restrict Sierra Glass, which faced the very real risk of an uninsured liability, and grant AOIC a double bite at escaping liability.  Id.[4]


An insurance company must consider the risks when it has a reservation of rights and denies a settlement for its insured within the policy limits.  AOIC lost control of the defense because it lost its interest in the litigation with its reservation of rights.  Once the claims were assigned, the judgment increased from a potential $1.9 million settlement to a $2.4 million judgment.  If there is a finding the insurance company denied the Sierra Glass claim in bad faith, compensatory, economic, and noneconomic damages are available, as well as punitive damages, not to exceed the amount of actual damages, to punish the insurer and deter wrongful conduct by other insurers.  C.R.S. § 13-21-102(1)-(3).  If bad faith is found, AOIC could pay as much as $4.8 million.  This type of reward creates an incentive for plaintiffs, like the Association, to accept an assignment of a claim, as contemplated by Nunn, which protects the insured from an excess judgment.

[1] Citing Diamond Lumber, Inc. V. H.C.M.C., Ltd., 746 P.2d 76, 78 (Colo. App. 1987).
[2] Citing Feigin v. Alexa Group., Ltd., 19 P.3d 23, 28 (Colo. 2001).
[3] Citing Travelers Indem. Co., v. Dingwell, 844 F.2d 629, 628 (1st Cir. 1989).
[4] Citing Dingwell, supra, at 639.

For additional information regarding Bolt Factory Lofts Owners Association, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company or about construction defect litigation in Colorado, generally, you can reach Frank Ingham by telephone at (303) 653-0046 or by e-mail at ingham@hhmrlaw.com.

Tuesday, October 8, 2019

Admissibility of Expert Opinions in Insurance Bad Faith Trials

In 2010, Hansen Construction was sued for construction defects and was defended by three separate insurance carriers pursuant to various primary CGL insurance policies.[i]  One of Hansen’s primary carriers, Maxum Indemnity Company, issued two primary policies, one from 2006-2007 and one from 2007-2008.  Everest National Insurance Company issued a single excess liability policy for the 2007-2008 policy year, and which was to drop down and provide additional coverage should the 2007-2008 Maxum policy become exhausted.  In November 2010, Maxum denied coverage under its 2007-2008 primarily policy but agreed to defend under the 2006-2007 primarily policy.  When Maxum denied coverage under its 2007-2008 primary policy, Everest National Insurance denied under its excess liability policy. 

In 2016, pursuant to a settlement agreement between Hansen Construction and Maxum, Maxum retroactively reallocated funds it owed to Hansen Construction from the 2006-2007 Maxum primary policy to the 2007-2008 Maxum primary policy, which became exhausted by the payment.  Thereafter, Hansen Construction demanded coverage from Everest National, which continued to deny the claim.  Hansen Construction then sued Everest National for, among other things, bad faith breach of contract.

In the bad faith action, both parties retained experts to testify at trial regarding insurance industry standards of care and whether Everest National’s conduct in handling Hansen Construction’s claim was reasonable.  Both parties sought to strike the other’s expert testimony as improper and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

In striking both sides’ expert opinions, the U.S. District Court Judge Christine Arguello set forth the standards for the admissibility of expert opinions in Federal Court:

Under Daubert, the trial court acts as a “gatekeeper” by reviewing a proffered expert opinion for relevance pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 401, and reliability pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.[ii]  The proponent of the expert must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert’s testimony and opinion are admissible.[iii]  This Court has discretion to evaluate whether an expert is helpful, qualified, and reliable under Rule 702.[iv]

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule 702 provides that a witness who is qualified as an expert by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” may testify if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

In deciding whether expert testimony is admissible, the Court must make multiple determinations. First, it must first determine whether the expert is qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to render an opinion.[v]  Second, if the expert is sufficiently qualified, the Court must determine whether the proposed testimony is sufficiently “relevant to the task at hand,” such that it “logically advances a material aspect of the case.”[vi]  “Doubts about whether an expert’s testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility unless there are strong factors such as time or surprise favoring exclusions.”[vii] 

Third, the Court examines whether the expert’s opinion “has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his [or her] discipline.’”[viii]  In determining reliability, a district court must decide “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.”[ix]  In making this determination, a court may consider: “(1) whether a theory has been or can be tested or falsified, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication, (3) whether there are known or potential rates of error with regard to specific techniques, and (4) whether the theory or approach has general acceptance.”[x] 

The Supreme Court has made clear that this list is neither definitive nor exhaustive.[xi]  In short, “[p]roposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.”[xii] 

The requirement that testimony must be reliable does not mean that the party offering such testimony must prove “that the expert is indisputably correct.”[xiii]  Rather, the party need only prove that “the method employed by the expert in reaching the conclusion is scientifically sound and that the opinion is based on facts which sufficiently satisfy Rule 702’s reliability requirements.”[xiv]  Guided by these principles, this Court has “broad discretion” to evaluate whether an expert is helpful, qualified, and reliable under the “flexible” standard of Fed. R. Evid. 702.[xv] 

With respect to helpfulness of expert opinions, Judge Arguello explained:

Federal Rule of Evidence 704 allows an expert witness to testify about an ultimate question of fact.[xvi]  To be admissible, however, an expert’s testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact.[xvii]  To ensure testimony is helpful, “[a]n expert may not state legal conclusions drawn by applying the law to the facts, but an expert may refer to the law in expressing his or her opinion.”[xviii] 

“The line between a permissible opinion on an ultimate issue and an impermissible legal conclusion is not always easy to discern.”[xix]  Permissible testimony provides the jury with the “tools to evaluate an expert’s ultimate conclusion and focuses on questions of fact that are amenable to the scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the expert’s field.”[xx]

However, “an expert may not simply tell the jury what result it should reach....”[xxi]  Further, “expert testimony is not admissible to inform the trier of fact as to the law that it will be instructed to apply to the facts in deciding the case.”[xxii]  Similarly, contract interpretation is not a proper subject for expert testimony.[xxiii] 

Finding that all three of the experts intended to offer opinions that were objectionable on the basis of helpfulness, Judge Arguello granted both parties’ motions to exclude the expert testimony of the opposing experts. 

For additional information about the Hansen Construction v. Everest National Insurance Company matter, or construction litigation in Colorado, you can reach Dave McLain at (303) 987-9813 or by e-mail at mclain@hhmrlaw.com.

[i] Hansen Construction, Inc. v. Everest National Insurance Company, 2019 WL 2602510 (D. Colo. June 25, 2019).
[iii] United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009)United States v. Crabbe, F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220–21 (D. Colo. 2008); Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory comm. notes.
[xiv] Id.
[xvi] United States v. Richter, 796 F.3d 1173, 1195 (10th Cir. 2015).
[xvii] Fed. R. Evid. 702.
[xviii] Richter, 796 F.3d at 1195 (quoting United States v. Bedford, 536 F.3d 1148, 1158 (10th Cir. 2008)); see, e.g.Killion v. KeHE Distribs., LLC, 761 F.3d 574, 592 (6th Cir. 2014) (report by proffered “liability expert,” which read “as a legal brief” exceeded scope of an expert’s permission to “opine on and embrace factual issues, not legal ones.”).
[xix] Richter, 796 F.3d at 1195 (quoting United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2006)).
[xx] Id. (citing United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Even if [an expert’s] testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue, such testimony is permissible as long as the expert’s testimony assists, rather than supplants, the jury’s judgment.”)).
[xxi] Id. at 1195–96 (quoting Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1171).
[xxii] 4 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 702.03[3] (supp. 2019) (citing, e.g.Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 361–62 (2d Cir. 1992) (expert witnesses may not compete with the court in instructing the jury)).
[xxiii] Id. (citing, e.g.Breezy Point Coop. v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Co., 868 F. Supp. 33, 35–36 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (expert witness’s proposed testimony that failure to give timely notice of loss violated terms of insurance policy was inadmissible because it would improperly interpret terms of a contract)). 


The information contained in this blog is provided for informational purposes only. It is not legal advice and should not be construed as providing legal advice on any subject matter.